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WADING IN: ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND 
QUEENSLAND’S CLEAN WATERS ACT 1971
DAVID J TURTON*
Queensland’s environmental regulatory agencies during 
the Premiership of Joh Bjelke-Petersen remain neglected 
by scholars, despite much literature on the State’s high 
profi le conservation confl icts in this era, such as Fraser 
Island. This article investigates the administration of the 
Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) by the Water Quality Council 
from 1970 to 1987. Using the Act as a case study, it seeks 
to examine different types of environmental governance 
factors and their impact on the effectiveness of legislation. 
It concludes that regulatory capture of individual 
Council members, resourcing constraints, ministerial 
interference, inspectorate discretion, a narrow conception 
of enforcement strategies, and limited public participation 
all conspired to reduce the effectiveness of both the Act 
and Council. While acknowledging the historical nature of 
the legislation, it is suggested that these problems remain 
causes for concern in maintaining robust environmental 
governance in the present.
I  INTRODUCTION
Environmental histories of Queensland during the Joh Bjelke-Petersen 
era have generally been confi ned to conservation campaigns, such 
as the Daintree,1 with little systematic examination of environmental
*  BA (Hons.) JCU, LLB (Grad.) student, James Cook University. The author 
wishes to thank Dr Jan Wegner, Dominique Thiriet, Dr Michael Briody, 
Dr Chris McGrath, Kate Galloway, Mandy Shircore and an anonymous 
referee for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1 See, eg, Phillip Toyne, The Reluctant Nation: Environment, Law and 
Politics in Australia (1994); Stephen Dovers, Australian Environmental 
History: Essays and Cases (1994); William Lines, Patriots: Defending 
Australia’s Natural Heritage (2006).
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 governance systems in force at that time.2 These have led to a disjointed 
conception of environmental problems in the Sunshine State. Effective 
environmental governance is a multifaceted exercise, and laws in 
themselves provide only part of the solution. As Fisher notes: ‘The law 
in itself is neither effective nor ineffective. So much depends upon the 
way the system is used by all those who have or may have access to 
it.’3 The effectiveness of environmental laws and the means by which 
they can be evaluated remain ongoing areas of discussion in the present 
era.4 
This article examines the Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) as a case study 
into the types of governance factors that impact on environmental 
legislation’s effectiveness. After critically examining the socio-political 
context in which the Act came into being, the article will consider the 
purpose, structure and functions of the Act. It will then specifi cally 
consider a number of factors that led to the Act’s ineffectiveness: the 
risk of regulatory capture of the Act’s administrative body, the Water 
Quality Council (‘the Council’), political interference at the ministerial 
level, the role of public servants, standards, the use of enforcement 
tools, as well as the public’s role in reporting offences and promoting 
agencies’ accountability. It will conclude that the multiple challenges 
encountered in the administration and enforcement of the Act at the 
time serve to provide guidance to present-day environmental regulators 
in effective environmental governance. 
2 See, eg, Ross Fitzgerald, From 1915 to the Early 1980s: A History of 
Queensland (1984); Drew Hutton and Libby Connors, A History of the 
Australian Environment Movement (1999).
3 Douglas Fisher, ‘The Nature of the Environmental Legal System’ in W. 
Duncan (ed.), Planning and Environment Law in Queensland (1993) 80, 
80.
4 See, Chris McGrath, Does Environmental Law Work?: How to Evaluate the 
Effectiveness of an Environmental Legal System (8 October 2010) <http://
www.envlaw.com.au/delw.pdf>.
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II  THE CLEAN WATERS ACT 1971 (QLD)
A  Social-Political Context
In 1970, when comprehensive water quality control legislation was 
introduced,5 environmental problems as signifi cant political issues 
in Queensland were ‘novel’,6 with environmental protection ‘yet to 
be contemplated’ seriously.7 The policy of the Country (National) 
Party (1957–89), particularly under the premiership of Joh Bjelke-
Petersen (1968–87), was to encourage development and progress, 
and was frequently at odds with effective environmental protection.8 
According to Grant and Papadakis, ‘Until the late 1980s, knowledge of 
environmental problems in Queensland was scarce and there was little 
pressure on government to act on this issue.’9 It was in this climate that 
the Act was enacted.
5 Queensland’s Clean Waters Act was a long time coming. ‘River pollution 
regulations’ were considered as early as 1957. However, disputes over 
departmental responsibility and concern that the Brisbane City Council 
would struggle with compliance meant that the proposal was ‘deferred’. 
Another effort was made in 1966 by the Co-ordinator General of Public 
Works in response to requests for more effective water pollution control. 
The Department also conducted surveys of water pollution problems in 
Queensland from July 1966 onwards, and its Minister, Wallace Rae, felt 
that ‘urgent action was required’. Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 
Legislative Assembly, 8 December 1971, 2689–2690 (Wallace Rae); 
Memorandum, Commissioner (Irrigation and Water Supply Commission) to 
Chief Investigation Engineer (Irrigation and Water Supply Commission), 20 
August 1959, Brisbane, Environmental Control Committee of Investigation 
(Queensland State Archives item ID: 882612).
6 Tor Hundloe, ‘The Environment’ in A. Patience (ed.), The Bjelke-Petersen 
Premiership, 1968–1983: Issues in Public Policy (1985) 81, 81.
7 Patricia Smith, ‘Queensland’s Political Culture’ in A. Patience (ed.), The 
Bjelke-Petersen Premiership, 1968-1983: Issues in Public Policy (1985) 
17, 27.
8 Fitzgerald, above n 2, 388; Simon Niemeyer, Environmental Politics in 
Queensland and Western Australia, 1970-1990: A Theoretical Exploration 
of Administrative and Regulatory Reform (BSc Hons. Thesis, Griffi th 
University, 1998). See also, Aynsley Kellow and Simon Niemeyer, ‘The 
Development of Environmental Administration in Queensland and Western 
Australia: Why Are They Different?’ (1999) 34(2) Australian Journal of 
Political Science 205, 207–10.
9 Richard Grant and Elim Papadakis, ‘Transforming Environmental 
Governance in a “Laggard” State’ (2004) 21(2) Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal 144, 147.
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B  Functions of the Act
Introduced after a Senate inquiry into water pollution in Australia,10 the 
Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) was a statute designed to oversee ‘the 
Preservation, Restoration and Enhancement of the Quality of the Waters 
of the State’.11 It was an example of command and control regulation, 
or direct regulation. The primary focus of the Act was on ‘appropriate 
control of activities, rather than on outright prohibition’.12 In such 
cases, the discretion of regulatory agencies and their fi eld offi cers is 
important for determining the extent of regulatory implementation.13 
This is discussed later.
The Act combated pollution in two ways. First, it attached conditions to 
licences for the discharge of wastes, with prescribed standards to limit 
pollution.14 Second, it imposed a duty of care upon the occupiers of 
premises to prevent water pollution and to avoid activities likely to cause 
it.15  Water pollution prevention was incorporated into town planning16 
and inspections of premises were conducted by water quality inspectors 
to ensure compliance with section 31.17 Failing to hold a licence for the 
discharge of wastes or failure to show a duty of care to prevent water 
pollution amounted to offences under the Act. 
10 Commonwealth Senate Select Committee on Water Pollution, Water 
Pollution in Australia: Report Parliamentary Paper No. 98 (1970).
11 Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld), long title.
12 James Prest, The Forgotten Forests: The Environmental Regulation of 
Forestry on Private Land in New South Wales Between 1997 and 2002 
(PhD Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2003) 43.
13 Ibid 43–44. Direct regulation has been criticised extensively in the literature 
in more recent times as ineffi cient and ineffective in comparison to ‘less 
interventionist’ forms of regulation. Prest, above n 12, 44–50.
14 Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) ss 23–24.
15 Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) s 31. This was consistent with a national trend 
towards imposing strict liability obligations on businesses to reduce pollution 
where possible. See, eg, Neil Gunningham, ‘Beyond Compliance: Management 
of Environmental Risk’ in B. Boer, R. Fowler and N. Gunningham (eds.), 
Environmental Outlook: Law and Policy (1994) 254, 256.
16 Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) s 37(1), (2).
17 Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) ss 42–44. Section 31 aimed to reduce 
water pollution by ensuring that occupiers of premises were instructed in 
compliance. It also established a process through which the Water Quality 
Council could enforce its recommendations for changes to an occupier’s 
pollution prevention procedures and practices so as to ensure compliance 
with the Act, subject to an appeal to the District Court.  Clean Waters Act 
1971 (Qld) ss 31, 41(1)(a)(iv).
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The Act gave inspectors extensive powers to monitor compliance.18 
Occupiers were required to cooperate and could be fi ned up to $400 
for obstructing an inspector. The Act also contained punitive measures. 
Penalties for breaching licences, or any other provision of the Act, 
including water quality standards as set by the Council, amounted 
to a $10 000 fi ne in the fi rst instance, $1000 per day for continuing 
offences, and $20 000 for all subsequent offences, with an additional 
$2000 per day for a continuing offence — or a combination of fi nes 
and 12 months’ imprisonment.19 In the absence of a specifi c penalty, 
a general provision imposed a fi ne not exceeding $400 and $40 each 
day if the offence continued. These were the highest penalties for non-
compliance for an environmental control Act in Australia at the time.20 
Initially criticised in the drafting stages of the legislation as likely to 
be a time-consuming and costly organisation,21 the Council eventually 
became the administrative body for the Act, subject to the Minister for 
Local Government.22
III  THE COUNCIL
A  Formation and Membership
Appointment of Council members occurred after Royal Assent to the 
statute on 22 December 1971,23 though most of the Act’s provisions 
would not come into force until 1 March 1973.24 The decision to give 
immediate legal effect to the Council was made so it could prepare 
Regulations provided for under the Act,25 necessary for issuing licences 
and drawing up waste discharge standards. The Council’s membership 
consisted of representatives from various Government departments: 
18 Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) ss 42(1), (2), 43, 44.
19 Clean Waters Act 1971 ss 48(a–b), 49.
20 Anne-Marie Lanteri, ‘Legislative Control of Environmental Quality’ in K. 
Lindgren, H. Mason and B. Gordon (eds.), The Corporation in Australian 
Society (1974) 185, 194.
21 Cabinet Minute Submission No. 14133, 10 June 1971, Department of Local 
Government and Electricity, Introduction of special legislation to deal with 
water pollution (Queensland State Archives item ID: 958746).
22 Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) s 9(1).
23 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 December 
1971, 2826; Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) ss 2(1), 10, 11.
24 Clean Waters Regulations 1973 (Qld) reg 2; Queensland, Parliamentary 
Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 June 1997, 2229 (Brian Littleproud).
25 Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) s 53; ‘Four-year plan for cleaner Qld. streams’, 
Courier Mail (Brisbane), 3 February 1972, 5.
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Irrigation and Water Supply Commission, Primary Industries, Harbours 
and Marine, Mines, Health, Co-ordinator General of Public Works, 
Industrial Development and Railways, and one representative each 
from the Queensland Chamber of Manufactures, Local Government 
Association of Queensland, Council of Agriculture, Queensland 
Institute of Technology, and Brisbane City Council.26 
Amendments to the Act in 1979 increased the size of the Council, 
with representatives from Queensland Fisheries Service, National 
Parks and Wildlife Service, Australian Sugar Producers Association 
and Griffi th University.27 Although conservationists were not directly 
represented, despite a submission from the Australian Littoral Society 
and Queensland Conservation Council pressing for this in 1979,28 their 
indirect infl uence increased with the amendment. For example, Des 
Connell was appointed as Griffi th University’s representative in October 
1979 and maintained his membership of the Australian Littoral Society 
while on the Council.29 The Council itself was abolished in 1987 and 
replaced by a State Environment Advisory Council.30 The Water Quality 
Council was charged with signifi cant responsibilities.
B  Purpose
The functions of the Council were to carry out or commission surveys, 
investigations and research into matters relating to the quality of waters, 
and report and make recommendations to the Minister on its fi ndings. 
Additionally, the Council was to have a public service role, collecting 
and disseminating information about the quality of waters, maintaining 
26 Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) s 12(1) (a–h).
27 Clean Waters Act Amendment Act 1979 (Qld) s 6, amending Clean Waters 
Act 1971 (Qld) s 12.
28 Anonymous, ‘Amendments to Queensland’s Clean Waters Act’ (1979) 2(4) 
Bulletin of the Australian Littoral Society 5, 6. The Queensland Littoral 
Society was formed in 1965 by divers, amateur naturalists and marine 
scientists at the University of Queensland. Its aims were to research and 
lobby for marine conservation. It became the Australian Littoral Society 
in the 1970s and in the mid-1990s, the Australian Marine Conservation 
Society. See, Australian Marine Conservation Society, In the Beginning, 
(23 August 2010) <http://www.marineconservation.org.au/About-AMCS.
asp?active_page_id=207>; Lines, above n 1, 62.
29 Interview with Professor Des Connell (Telephone interview, 17 September 
2007).
30 State Environment Act 1988 (Qld) ss 8, 53–87.
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surveillance over discharge of waters, advising organisations on the 
prevention of water pollution, and recommending to the Minister 
changes to the Act, repeal of regulations, administration of the Act and 
other recommendations for the purposes stated above in the long title 
to the Act.31 Given the interests represented on the Council, particularly 
in its earlier phase of narrow representation, and its role in regulating 
water pollution, the risk of regulatory capture arose.
IV  REGULATORY CAPTURE
A  Defi nition
‘Regulatory capture’ describes ‘the development of a predisposition 
by regulators to make decisions and take actions consistent with the 
preferences of the regulated industry.’32 Regulatory capture has been 
further defi ned as ‘the prediction that, over time, regulators come to be 
more concerned to serve the interests of the industry with which they are 
in regular contact, than the more remote and abstract public interest’.33 
One model of regulatory capture is based on the idea of undue infl uence, 
specifi cally a ‘revolving door’ concept that posits regulators wooed by 
employment opportunities in the regulated industry and infl uenced to 
be sympathetic towards the regulated population. Another problem 
occurs when regulators are taken from the regulated industries, leading 
to bias.34 Another model is systemic capture, which occurs where an 
entire regulatory system is captured by the industries being regulated, 
for example where inspectors and their political masters are captured.35 
Regulatory capture takes many forms and is found in regulators that 
have an overly close relationship with industry and where there is a 
heavy emphasis on negotiations with industry to draw up conditions 
31 Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) s 20(1)(a–e), (2)(a–d).
32 Barry Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing 
and Removing Regulatory Forms (1980) 207.
33 Peter Grabosky and John Braithwaite, Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement 
Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory Agencies (1986) 198.
34  Ibid.
35 Simon Marsden, Kathy Gibson and Carl Hollingsworth, ‘Tasmania’s 
Environmental Improvement Programs and the “Brown Issues” — 
Environmental Accountability or Regulatory Capture?’ (2000) 17(1) 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 24, 26.
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‘unduly favourable to industry and contrary to the public interest’.36 It 
can become a contest between the need for a cooperative relationship 
between the regulatee and the regulator, and the risk of regulatory capture 
and corruption that an environment of cooperation can promote.37 
As will be seen below, this risk is increased by lack of transparency. 
Several studies of environmental administration in Queensland have 
made reference to the concept and it is useful to consider the literature 
briefl y.
B  Literature Overview
At the national level in the 1980s, Grabosky and Braithwaite’s pioneering 
efforts delved into Australian environmental regulators including the 
Council,38 despite the responsible Minister (Russell Hinze) refusing to 
cooperate.39 Their study went beyond environmental issues to encompass 
topics as varied as occupational health and safety and consumer affairs, 
but brief comments were made about the secretive nature of the Council 
and its conciliatory attitude to industry.40 
A lack of ministerial cooperation, the wide brief of their work and the 
limited range of sources consulted (annual reports of the Council), 
prevented any in-depth discussion of instances of regulatory behaviour 
that pointed to the risk of regulatory capture. Their conclusions therefore 
lack the additional evidence that this article is able to provide through 
access to records of Council meetings and interviews with participants 
in the Act’s regulatory process. Nonetheless, their view of the Council 
gave weight to additional critiques of the Act in the 1970s, from groups 
36 Neil Gunningham, ‘Voluntary and Negotiated Agreements in Agriculture: 
Towards a Partnership Approach to Resource Management’ (2003) 8(1) 
Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 1, 18.
37 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (1992) 55.
38 Grabosky and Braithwaite, above n 33, 27–54.
39 Ibid 5. The authors also note on pages 4–5 that of the ‘116 regulatory 
and quasi-regulatory agencies’ approached by the authors, only two other 
organisations refused outright to cooperate with the researchers, namely the 
New South Wales Department of Industrial Relations and the Queensland 
Air Pollution Council — the latter ‘at the instruction of their Minister Russ 
Hinze’. 
40 Grabosky and Braithwaite, above n 33, 44, 195.
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such as a law student public interest collective and scientists.41 Critics 
queried the capacity of some organisations represented on the Council 
to impartially regulate industries with which they were associated. 
Subsequent commentators drew on Grabosky and Braithwaite’s fi ndings 
to inform their Queensland focused research.
Investigations into regulatory capture amongst Queensland’s 
environmental regulators continued in the 1990s, following many 
legislative reforms, including the enactment of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1994 (Qld). Briody and Prenzler’s post-Fitzgerald 
(1989–97) analysis researched Queensland’s environmental protection 
laws and regulatory capture.42 That study examined the Queensland 
Department of Environment (a successor to the Council) and the 
Environmental Compliance Division of the Queensland Department of 
Mines and Energy under both National and Labor governments. It found 
a case for capture in the latter Department and evidence of signifi cant 
under-enforcement in the former Department.43 Another important 
work is Maddin’s extended study of the 1993–4 Queensland Criminal 
Justice Commission Inquiry into the Improper Disposal of Liquid Waste 
in South-East Queensland. Maddin used regulatory capture to explain 
a culture of under-enforcement within Queensland’s environmental 
protection and mining industry regulators, particularly as revealed by 
41 Public Interest Research Group, Legalised Pollution: the State of Queensland 
(1973) 67–72; Walter Westman, ‘The Queensland Clean Waters Act, 1971: 
A Critical Review’ (1972) 2(2) Operculum 32; G.G. Miller, J.D. Davie and 
E.J. Heurle, ‘An Assessment of Queensland’s Progress Towards Cleaner 
Waters’ (1976) 5(1) Operculum 3. A useful summary of the criticisms of the 
Act can be found in Jan Wegner, ‘Sludge on Tap: Queensland’s First Water 
Pollution Legislation, 1944-1985’ (2009) 15(2) Environment and History 
199, 210.
42 Michael Briody and Tim Prenzler, ‘The Enforcement of Environmental 
Protection Laws in Queensland: A Case of Regulatory Capture?’ (1998) 
15(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 54; Michael Briody, 
Enforcing Environmental Protection Laws in Post-Fitzgerald Queensland 
(BA Hons. Thesis, Griffi th University, 1997); Cf John Gilmour, ‘Letter to 
the Editor’ (1998) 15(3) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 163.
43 Briody and Prenzler, above n 42, 54. For an expansion on Briody and 
Prenzler’s fi ndings in relation to the mining industry, see Drew Hutton, 
‘Mining and the Environment in Queensland: Where the Law Begins and 
Enforcement Fails — Regulatory Capture and Implementation Failure’ 
(1999) 6(2) Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 
149; Drew Hutton, ‘Countering Environmental Crime: The Role of 
Environmental Regulators’ (2000) 19(2) Social Alternatives 24.
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Commission evidence.44 Briody and Prenzler’s fi ndings are especially 
important for this article and are summarised below.
Briody and Prenzler could not perceive regulatory capture in the 
Department of Environment, because of its non-industry facilitation 
role; regulation of diverse industries rather than a single industry; the 
Department’s status as a stand-alone regulator instead of being part of 
a larger Department; the inspectorate’s lack of regular contact with the 
same client companies; little personnel interchange between industry 
and the Department; and the diversity of businesses being regulated by 
the Department.45 Almost all of these behaviours apply to the Council. 
The exception was its status in relation to other regulators since the 
Council was tied to a larger Department of Local Government.
Briody and Prenzler claimed the Department of Environment’s tradition 
of under enforcement was a legacy of its predecessors such as the 
Council. They contend that part of that tradition was a lack of training 
in prosecutorial techniques and a history of anti-environmentalism 
among the State’s politicians, concluding that while there ‘was no solid 
evidence of frequent and direct political interference, there is strong 
circumstantial evidence regarding political infl uence’.46 Similar fi ndings 
were made by this study when investigating the pre-Fitzgerald Council 
for indications of regulatory capture. Some warning signs of capture 
arose during the drafting of the Clean Waters Bill.
C  Bill Preparation Bias
Input into the drafting of the Clean Waters Bill was received from 
industry submissions made in February 1971 from a committee 
composed of representatives from the Chamber of Mines, Chamber of 
Manufactures, Institution of Engineers, Institution of Fuel Engineers, 
and the Institution of Chemical Engineers. It asked that industry be 
allowed to participate in making decisions with fi nancial implications for 
it, and that it had much to offer in the way of experience and knowledge 
to the proposed regulatory body. Labor Opposition members argued 
44  Hayley Maddin, Regulating for Environmental Protection: A Case Study of 
the CJC Inquiry into the Improper Disposal of Liquid Waste in South-East 
Queensland (MA Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 1996). 
Other Australian jurisdictions, such as Tasmania, have also been examined 
for regulatory capture: see Marsden, Gibson and Hollingsworth, above n 
35, 24–33.
45 Briody, above n 42, 73.
46 Briody and Prenzler, above n 42, 69; Briody, above n 42, 68–73.
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during the Parliamentary debate to the Bill that this extended time-
frame of seven years would be a disincentive to speedy compliance, 
and that three years was suffi cient.47 Labor attacked the Minister’s 
sympathetic response to submissions by the Chamber of Mines and the 
Chamber of Manufactures for representation on the proposed Council, 
while he ignored the more ecologically knowledgeable Queensland 
Littoral Society.48 Ultimately, a Council of ‘interested Government 
Departments, primary industry, secondary industry, local government 
and tertiary education’ was created.49
Concessions granted to government departments identifying with 
industry interests aggravated the risk of regulatory capture. Pressure from 
the Department of Industrial Development for progressive compliance 
with the Act for existing industries is one example. The Department 
believed that in view of the presumed clean up costs, considerable time 
would be needed to reach the necessary standards of compliance and 
cited the Clean Air Act 1963 (Qld) in support of its argument, since 
that Act had a ‘grace period’ of seven years. The Minister for Local 
Government, Wallace Rae, granted a four year period initially, but the 
Council was given the power to increase this by a further three years. 
With this compromise incorporated into the Bill, Rae recommended 
that it be introduced to Parliament.50 Regulatory capture remained an 
issue when the Council was created.
D  Regulatory Capture and the Council
The political and social context for the Act, described above, provided 
a likely environment for regulatory capture to thrive. Given the 
pro-development attitude of Government departments in charge of 
industries, and the fact that local government sanitation schemes were 
among the worst polluters, regulatory capture would seem likely.51 The 
confi dentiality of Council meetings also increased the likelihood of 
47 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 December 
1971, 2694 (Harold Dean and Douglas Sherrington).
48 Ibid 2701–2 (Douglas Sherrington).
49 Cabinet Minute Submission No. 14133, 10 June 1971, Department of Local 
Government and Electricity, Introduction of special legislation to deal with 
water pollution (Queensland State Archives item ID: 958746).
50 Cabinet Minute Decision No. 16461, 15 November 1971, Department of 
Local Government, Introduction of special legislation to deal with water 
pollution (Queensland State Archives item ID: 958746).
51 See, eg, Quart Pot Creek, Stanthorpe — Pollution (Queensland State 
Archives item ID: 882578). 
57Wading In: Environmental Governance And Queensland’s CWA 1971
regulatory capture. Indeed the narrow interests represented on the Council 
and the willingness of the Government to act on the recommendations 
of development-minded pressure groups (as discussed above), does 
raise questions of potential bias. This issue was pursued by the Labor 
Opposition, as the following example demonstrates.
The Labor Opposition questioned the Council’s composition and the role 
of politics in the Act’s enforcement within a short period of the statute 
entering into force, suggesting that regulatory capture played a part in 
preventing prosecutions by the Council. An example was pollution at 
the junction of the Brisbane and Bremer Rivers (near Ipswich) from 
the insecticide dieldrin, leading to the deaths of catfi sh. An inspector 
from the Brisbane Port Authority located fi sh with a high concentration 
of dieldrin and tests were conducted. The inspector reported that the 
dieldrin had been traced to Morris Woollen Mills (Ipswich) Pty Ltd. 
The inspector was instructed to ‘hand his documentation and evidence 
to the Water Quality Council’. Nothing more occurred, leading Labor 
Opposition Spokesman for Water Conservation, Tom Burns, to claim that 
this was the standard practice of the Council ‘because of its domination 
by people representing the polluters and not those representing the 
polluted’ and that these individuals could ‘stop inspectors taking certain 
action’ — namely prosecutions.52 The Labor Opposition Member for 
Ipswich West, David Underwood, claimed that the Government was 
reluctant to take action against Morris Woollen Mills because its owner, 
Ivor Morris, was a ‘leading National Party member’.53 Hinze dismissed 
the accusation of political interference and regulatory capture in the 
Act’s administration as a ‘complete fabrication’, but did not attempt to 
offer an alternative explanation.54
Nonetheless, individual members of the Council with an industry 
affi liation did vote in a sympathetic manner where an industry they 
52 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 6 June 1979, 
4926 (Tom Burns); Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Assembly, 5 June 1979, 4872 (Tom Burns).
53 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 June 1979, 
4879–80 (David Underwood).
54 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 6 June 
1979, 4923 (Russell Hinze). One former Councillor confi rms that private 
representations made by industry to the Minister impacted negatively on 
decisions to prosecute. Interview with Professor Des Connell (Telephone 
interview, 17 September 2007). For other examples of possible confl icts 
of interest involving Hinze, see Rae Wear, Johannes Bjelke-Petersen: the 
Lord’s Premier (2002) 145–6.
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identifi ed with was under discussion. A specifi c example of this was 
the Council’s recommendation to the Minister that Tully Co-operative 
Sugar Milling Association Ltd be prosecuted for breaches of section 
23 of the Act. Eleven members voted in favour of prosecuting the 
company with two against. Those in the minority were Mr Leverington 
and Sir Joseph McAvoy, Council representatives for the sugar industry 
and primary industries respectively.55 Such voting decisions were kept 
hidden from the public with confi dential Council meetings, increasing 
the risk of regulatory capture through a lack of transparency. One study 
noted this and contended that: ‘the Council keeps a low profi le, and 
adverse publicity is used sparingly’.56
From the admittedly incomplete evidence available from the Council’s 
meetings,57 it seems that although some individual Council members 
were captured by the interests they represented, the Council as a whole 
was not. However, regulatory capture is only one of the obstacles that 
can hinder effective environmental governance — insuffi cient resources 
are another.
V  RESOURCING CONSTRAINTS
The Council laboured under an enormous monitoring exercise with 
limited resources. By the middle of 1981 the staff of the Council 
totalled 42, with seven inspectors.58 Most were in Brisbane, and a 
regional offi ce in Townsville did not open until 1977.59 Although the 
Council recognised the public’s role in reporting pollution, it and the 
Department of Local Government were not necessarily in a position to 
respond promptly to their complaints. 
55 Minutes of the 97th Meeting of the Water Quality Council of Queensland, 
24 February 1982, Environmental Co-Ordination, Waste Disposal, Water 
Quality Council of Queensland, Minutes and Agendas of Meetings 
(Queensland State Archives item ID: 574173); Queensland, Annual Report 
of the Water Quality Council of Queensland for the year ended 30 June, 
Parliamentary Paper No. 51 (1982) 1.
56 Grabosky and Braithwaite, above n 33, 44, 195.
57 There are gaps in the Queensland State Archives’ set of meetings records, 
which end in 1985. Bonyhady also had diffi culty obtaining information from 
industry and government on environmental disputes, see Tim Bonyhady, 
Places Worth Keeping: Conservationists, Politics and Law (1993) ix. 
58 Queensland, Annual Report of the Water Quality Council of Queensland 
for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary Paper No. 50 (1981) 1.
59 ‘Pollution group not adequate’, Courier Mail (Brisbane), 1 October 1977, 8.
59Wading In: Environmental Governance And Queensland’s CWA 1971
The Council lacked an after-hours answering service for complaints, 
prompting the Opposition’s Tom Burns to claim that discharges were 
taking place on Friday evenings ‘when one cannot get an inspector on 
the phone’, so that when inspectors resumed their duties on Monday 
morning ‘all the effl uent that was poured into the river on Friday night 
has been dispersed by the action of the tide’.60 During the second reading 
of the Clean Waters Amendment Bill 1979 to Parliament, Burns urged 
the Government to provide a 24-hour telephone answering service, 
suggesting that the calls could be transferred to the home numbers of 
inspectors to allow a faster response.61 Minister Russell Hinze responded 
that 24-hour monitoring of the Brisbane River was impossible and that 
arrangements were being made to ensure that inspectors were available 
at all times to receive complaints.62 However, no such arrangements 
were implemented until the Department of Environment and Heritage 
introduced an after-hours emergency response service in September 
1990.63 This was in contrast to the New South Wales State Pollution 
Control Commission, which introduced a 24-hour telephone complaints 
service in 1977.64 
Without adequate monitoring and enforcement, command and control 
regulation such as that used in the Act is weakened considerably.65 The 
creation of an emergency response service in Queensland may have been 
driven by decentralising policies of the Department of Environment 
and Heritage, which had concluded by 1990 that despite a ‘plethora 
of environmental legislation’, the organisation suffered from the ‘lack 
of a grass roots service, which can respond to the growing demands of 
the general public for an improved environment and their need to be 
60 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 May 1979, 
4522 (Tom Burns); ‘River polluted after work hours’, Courier Mail 
(Brisbane), 6 June 1979, 11.
61 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 June 1979, 
4873 (Tom Burns).
62 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 6 June 1979, 
4923 (Russell Hinze); ‘Pollution “no trouble”’, Courier Mail (Brisbane), 7 
June 1979, 13.
63 Queensland, Annual Report of the Department of Environment and Heritage 
for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary Paper No. 86 (1991) 27.
64 Dan Coward, Out of Sight: Sydney’s Environmental History, 1851–1981 
(1988) 302.
65 Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy (1998) 41.
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involved in the improvement process’.66 It seems clear that the Council 
struggled in a period of scarce resources for environmental protection. 
The shift in attitudes towards public engagement with the Act occurred 
at a time of political change in Queensland and consequently the role of 
political interference in the Act’s administration cannot be ignored.
VI  POLITICAL INTERFERENCE 
Ministerial interference in the Act’s administration is supported by 
Norberry’s research into the enforcement of the statute. It suggests 
that political interference in the prosecution process occurred, with the 
withdrawal of at least one prosecution by the Minister and approval for 
one prosecution not being granted by the Minister in another case.67 
However, Norberry does not provide details of these incidents of 
political interference. Nor does she explore the wider consequences of 
ministerial bias in environmental administration in Queensland and the 
impact this had on the Act’s implementation. These issues are addressed 
here in an attempt to offer an holistic perspective on the causes of the 
Act’s ineffectiveness, thereby highlighting some of the factors that drive 
strong environmental governance more generally in the present.  
A  The Minister
The Minister to whom the Council was responsible for the Act’s 
administration from 1974 to 1987 was Russell Hinze. The year 1981 
spelled the end of the ‘grace period’ for compliance under the Act. 
Therefore it is important to consider Hinze’s actions in relation to 
Council recommendations between 1981 and 1987 when prosecutions 
were most likely. Hinze had a reputation for ignoring questions from 
journalists about the possible confl ict of interest he might have had in 
his roles as Minister for Local Government and property developer, 
curtly replying: ‘That’s not a confl ict of interest, that’s convergence of 
66  A.D. Gormley, ‘Environmental Issues in Queensland’ (Paper presented at 
the Local Government Engineers’ Association of Queensland 41st Annual 
Conference, Logan, Queensland, 30 September — 5 October 1990) 1, 2. I 
thank Dr Simon Niemeyer for drawing this to my attention.
67 Jennifer Norberry, ‘Environmental Offences: Australian Responses’ in D. 
Chappell and P. Wilson (eds.), The Australian Criminal Justice System: 
The Mid 1990s (1994) 156, 167.
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interest.’68 His strength of personality and disregard for administrative 
conventions were legendary. The following examples illustrate this.
B  Case-studies and Allegations of Ministerial Interference
The attitude of the Minister is clearly indicated by his actions following 
the Council’s decision, acting on advice from the Solicitor General, 
to recommend that Babinda Co-operative Sugar Mill Society Ltd be 
prosecuted for a large fi sh kill at Babinda Creek in Far North Queensland 
in October 1984. The pollution incident was caused by a spill of ‘some 
70 to 80m³ [cubic metres] of 6 % to 9 % Caustic Soda … during the 
weekend cleaning of vessels’.69 The Minister refused to prosecute, to 
the Council’s disgust. Griffi th University’s Council representative Des 
Connell observed that ‘it was a widely held view that the Water Quality 
Council do not prosecute’. The then Director of Water Quality in the 
Department of Local Government, Humphrey Desmond, agreed and 
commented: 
[T]he Minister [Russell Hinze] was prepared to be extremely 
tolerant of Companies which provide jobs for the people of 
Queensland … the Minister’s policy was to call offenders into his 
offi ce and give them a good talking to and extract a promise from 
them to ensure that further pollution incidents did not recur.70
Another example of direct intervention from Hinze was in relation to 
Queensland Aluminium Ltd of Gladstone, which discharged slurry 
from a pipeline broken by corrosion. The spill was discovered by a 
jogger and reported to the Council.71 Advice from the Solicitor General 
D.V. Galligan indicated that a prosecution was possible.72 Due to the 
68 Peter Botsman, ‘Post-Fitzgerald Queensland’ (Paper presented at the 
Australian Society of Archivists Annual Conference: ‘Archives at Risk 
— Accountability, Vulnerability and Creditability’, Brisbane, 29–31 July 
1999) 138. I thank Dr Doug Hunt for drawing this to my attention.
69 Agenda and Minutes of the 124th Meeting of the Water Quality Council 
of Queensland, 14 November 1984, Environmental Co-ordination, Waste 
Disposal, Water Quality Council of Queensland, Minutes and Agendas of 
Meetings (Queensland State Archives item ID: 574185).
70 Ibid.
71 Interview with Anonymous Interviewee #1 (Telephone interview, 25 
September 2007).
72 Minutes of the 99th Meeting of the Water Quality Council of Queensland, 12 
May 1982, Environmental Co-Ordination, Waste Disposal, Water Quality 
Council of Queensland, Minutes and Agendas of Meetings (Queensland 
State Archives item ID: 574174).
62 David J Turton
Council’s administrative move to the Department of Water Resources 
and Aboriginal and Islander Affairs,73 Hinze did not oversee the 
matter. Instead the Minister for Water Resources and Aboriginal and 
Islander Affairs, Kenneth Tomkins, authorised the fi rst prosecution 
under the Act.74 A hearing was set in the Gladstone Magistrates Court 
for 8 September 1982.75 However, the hearing was adjourned until 22 
November as a Senior Inspector of Water Quality considered essential 
to the prosecution was unable to attend due to illness.76 Before the 
hearing could commence, the Council was moved back to its previous 
department and Minister, Russell Hinze, who would not allow the 
prosecution to continue.77
C  Ministerial Bias
Hinze was facing eight charges of offi cial corruption at the time of 
his death from cancer in June 1991,78 following allegations from the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry that he and his family’s companies were given over 
$4 million in loans, gifts and other payments from developers.79 Given 
this allegation, the remarks of Council members above, and Hinze’s 
own actions when faced with recommendations for a prosecution from 
the Council, it seems reasonable to suggest that Hinze’s Ministerial 
73 Queensland, Annual Report of the Water Quality Council of Queensland 
for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary Paper No. 50 (1981) 1.
74 Minutes of the 100th Meeting of the Water Quality Council of Queensland, 
16 June 1982, Environmental Co-Ordination, Waste Disposal, Water Quality 
Council of Queensland, Minutes and Agendas of Meetings (Queensland 
State Archives item ID: 574174).
75 Notice of the 102nd Meeting of the Water Quality Council of Queensland, 
25 August 1982, Environmental Co-Ordination, Waste Disposal, Water 
Quality Council of Queensland, Minutes and Agendas of Meetings 
(Queensland State Archives item ID: 574175).
76 Notice of the 103rd Meeting of the Water Quality Council of Queensland, 
29 September 1982, Environmental Co-Ordination, Waste Disposal, Water 
Pollution (other than oil) (Queensland State Archives item ID: 574175).
77 Minutes of the 111th Meeting of the Water Quality Council of Queensland, 
27 July 1983, Environmental Co-ordination, Waste Disposal, Water Quality 
Council of Queensland, Minutes and Agendas of Meetings (Queensland 
State Archives item ID: 574178).
78 Pat Gillespie and Guy Ker, ‘Big Russ Goes Quietly’, Sunday Mail 
(Brisbane), 30 June 1991, 1.
79 Evan Whitton, The Hillbilly Dictator: Australia’s Police State (1993) 159, 
181; Phil Dickie, The Road to Fitzgerald and Beyond (1989) 318. I thank 
Dr Doug Hunt for drawing these to my attention.
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responsibilities under the Clean Waters Act may have been compromised 
by his association with pro-development interests. It is also worth 
noting the contempt held by Hinze towards conservationists — whom 
he called ‘fairies at the bottom of the garden’80 — indicating which 
pressure groups would most probably infl uence his decisions. 
Avoiding ministerial interference requires strict demarcation of 
responsibilities and powers between public servants and their political 
masters. The political environment must also be conducive to unbiased 
enforcement. Such factors were glaringly absent during this period. 
It is tempting to treat political interference by Hinze as the source of 
all failed prosecutions under the Act. However, as noted earlier by 
Prest,81 the decisions of regulators in the fi eld also play a signifi cant 
role in the implementation of environmental laws and must therefore 
be considered.
VII  THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SERVANTS 
Recent evidence suggests there were other reasons for the types 
of enforcement action taken under the Act, beyond the ministerial 
interference and resource constraints described above.  Some incidents 
of pollution did not reach the Minister, as they were ‘swept under the 
carpet’ by members of the Department of Local Government, thus 
denying him the opportunity to exercise his ministerial discretion to 
order a prosecution — in spite of an abundance of evidence which 
existed to substantiate one in court.82 Others believe that ‘key members 
of the [Queensland] public service have had a signifi cant infl uence on 
the direction of environmental policy [in that state]’.83 Comino contends 
that in this era ‘the Queensland defi nition of “public” so far as the public 
service is concerned has been equated with developers — the public 
80 Edmund Burke, ‘Tide turns in fi ght for river’, Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 
21 January 2007, 41. Conservationist Di Tarte later explained that ‘Hinze 
made this comment when a colleague and I accompanied the Minister on 
an inspection of the Donaldson Road (Oxley) sewage treatment plant.’ 
Email from Di Tarte to David Turton, 2 December 2009. See also, Ross 
Fitzgerald, Lyndon Megarrity and David Symons, Made in Queensland: A 
New History (2009) 156.
81 Prest, above n 12, 43–4.
82 Interview with Anonymous Interviewee #2 (Telephone interview, 28 
August 2008); Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) s 47(2).
83 Kellow and Niemeyer, above n 8, 218.
64 David J Turton
service is there for the most part to serve developers.’84 It is a theme 
with a rich tradition in Queensland, as the next section demonstrates.
A  Perspectives from Commentators
Comino’s views are consistent with the fi ndings of Briody and Prenzler, 
who found that the Department of Environment had a tradition of under-
enforcement.85 Maddin agrees, adding that Department of Environment 
and Heritage fi eld inspectors were ‘given little back-up from their 
superiors and were reluctant to press charges or even conduct serious 
investigations’.86 Maddin cites evidence given to the Queensland 
Criminal Justice Commission Inquiry into the Improper Disposal of 
Liquid Waste in South-East Queensland by the Executive Director for 
the Environment Division, John Gilmour, who indicated that: 
[M]onitoring premises for compliance with sections 31 and 34 
of the Clean Waters Act 1971–1979 (Qld) did not occur and … 
these premises were found only upon receiving complaints or 
through being discovered when being inspected for, for example, 
compliance with licence conditions.87 
Maddin argues a culture of non-enforcement in the Department 
was exacerbated by the fact that criminal matters did not fall under 
the responsibility of ‘regional enforcement lawyers and specialised 
investigators’, but were ‘left to compliance inspectors in the fi eld’.88 
This was not unusual. Hemmings has suggested that past prosecutions 
for breaches of licence conditions under environmental laws in New 
South Wales were dependent to an extent ‘upon the attitude … of the 
investigating offi cer or public pressure’.89 Another author concerned with 
84 Maria Comino, ‘Sustainable Development: The Role of Law’ (1991) 16(2) 
Legal Service Bulletin 57, 57.
85 Briody and Prenzler, above n 42, 54–71.
86 Maddin, above n 44, 140. See also, Hutton and Connors, above n 2, 202.
87 Maddin, above n 44, 109. These sections related to the duty of care placed 
upon licence holders to prevent water pollution and ministerial powers to 
prevent, abate or mitigate water pollution. See also, Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, 
‘Evaluating Performance on the Environment’ in B. Stevens and J. Wanna 
(eds.) The Goss Government: Promise and Performance of Labor in 
Queensland (1993) 248, 261–2.
88 Maddin, above n 44, 109–112, 140.
89 Noel Hemmings, ‘Issues of Legal Process in Environmental Prosecutions’ 
(Paper presented at the National Environmental Law Association 11th 
Annual Conference, Perth, 20–22 September 1992) 311.  Shifting attitudes 
amongst different generations of regulators has been noted as important for 
enforcement by other researchers. See, eg, Norberry, above n 67, 169.
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land degradation on the Darling Downs has suggested that Queensland 
government departments adopted a passive attitude towards breaches 
of environmental laws in keeping with a bureaucratic conservatism that 
suited ministers fearing an electoral backlash.90 This has also been noted 
as a possible explanation for a reluctance to prosecute amongst the 
State’s current environmental agencies.91 Beyond these commentators, 
the role of public servants in enforcing the Act came to be scrutinised by 
independent voices, including the Queensland Ombudsman, suggesting 
that the policy of prosecution as a last resort under the Act created 
inexperienced evidence collectors. 
B  Evidence Collection
The inexperience of inspectors in collecting suitable evidence against 
polluters may be another explanation for the lack of prosecutions under 
the Act. Early attempts at prosecution failed according to one inspector 
because ‘we were a bit naïve about getting evidence’.92 Haigh has 
suggested that the Council’s (and subsequently various Departments’) 
policy of prosecution as a last resort led to a lack of experience of 
enforcement in the bureaucracy and ‘accordingly they couldn’t even 
gather proper evidence … it was a joke, it was a tragedy really’.93 
90 Mark Carden, ‘Land Degradation on the Darling Downs’ in K. Walker 
(ed.), Australian Environmental Policy: Ten Case Studies (1992) 58, 73–6. 
I wish to thank Dr Chris McGrath for drawing this to my attention.  For 
information on the politicisation of the Queensland Public Service during 
the Bjelke-Petersen era, see Wear, above n 54, 190–1.
91 See, eg, Chris McGrath, ‘Case Note: Booth v Bosworth’ (2001) 18(1) 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 23, 24, 28; Chris McGrath, 
‘The Flying Fox Case’ (2001) 18(6) Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 540, 559, 560; Dominique Thiriet, ‘The Relocation of Flying 
Fox Colonies in Queensland’ (2005) 22(3) Environmental and Planning 
Law Journal 231, 237, 238–9. See also Dominique Thiriet, ‘Flying Fox 
Conservation Laws, Policies and Practices in Australia — A Case Study 
in Conserving Unpopular Species’ (2010) 13(2) Australasian Journal of 
Natural Resources Law and Policy 161. There are now better regulatory 
practices in place as a result of the Flying Fox Case.
92 Interview with Anonymous Interviewee #1 (Telephone interview, 25 
September 2007).
93 Interview with David Haigh (Telephone interview, 11 September 2007); 
David Haigh, ‘Environmental Administration: Testing the Water’ (1991) 
16 (4) Legal Service Bulletin 172–3; Su Wild River, The Environmental 
Implications of the Local-State Antinomy in Australia (PhD Thesis, 
Australian National University, 2002) 116–7.
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Certainly his comments are supported by evidence of collection 
problems following fi sh kills at the Barwon River.
In the last days of 1988, a cotton farmer had allowed the pesticide 
Endosulfan to wash into the Barwon River, which forms part of the 
border between Queensland and New South Wales, and a large fi sh kill 
occurred.94 It was observed by a police offi cer, who reported this to the 
then Department of Environment and Conservation, who directed him 
to take samples of the water.95 A nearby resident made a complaint over 
the ‘failure of the Department to prosecute the person responsible for the 
discharge of chemicals’ to the Queensland Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Administrative Investigations96 — an offi ce with identical functions 
to the present-day Queensland Ombudsman.97
The Commissioner’s report into the Barwon River incident found that the 
‘procedures adopted by the Department … to enforce the Clean Waters 
Act were defective’.98 It concluded that the water sample collected as 
evidence by the police offi cer was inadmissible as he was not authorised 
under the Act as an appointed inspector or analyst to collect samples in 
accordance with ‘accepted procedural guidelines’.99 Offi cers from the 
94 ‘Pesticides killed fi sh, tests show’, Courier Mail (Brisbane), 7 January 
1989, 5; Queensland, Annual Report of the Department of Environment 
and Conservation Queensland for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary 
Paper No. 65 (1989) 9.
95 Queensland, Annual Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administrative Investigations for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary 
Paper No. 109 (1991) 2. I thank Stephen Keim SC for drawing this to 
my attention. The Department of Environment and Conservation was 
subsequently renamed the Department of Environment, Conservation and 
Forestry in January 1989. See Queensland, Annual Report of the Department 
of Environment and Conservation Queensland for the year ended 30 June, 
Parliamentary Paper No. 65 (1989) 3.
96 Queensland, Annual Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administrative Investigations for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary Paper 
No. 109 (1991) 28; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1974 (Qld) s 16.
97 See Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld) ss 95, 97. The Commissioner could 
investigate the Department and its administrative actions on several grounds, 
including that such actions were taken contrary to law, were based wholly 
or partly on mistake of law or fact, or were wrong. See Parliamentary 
Commissioner Act 1974 (Qld) ss 4, 12, 13 (1), 24 (a), (f), (g).
98 Queensland, Annual Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administrative Investigations for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary 
Paper No. 109 (1991) 2.
99 Ibid 28; Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) ss 8, 42.
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Department subsequently took samples of their own;100 however, these, 
too, were inadmissible due to a failure to apply appropriate procedures 
of evidence collection. When further samples were taken in response to 
a ‘subsequent fi sh kill’ in the area, the ‘requirements for the collection 
and preservation of evidence, together with the record of evidence’ 
yet again did not meet the required standard of proof for a successful 
prosecution.101
The Department admitted that the Act’s procedural requirements for 
evidence collection were diffi cult to administer and were in need of 
review.102 A program aimed to better train inspectors in evidence 
collecting procedures was also commenced in response to the 
Commissioner’s investigation.103 Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the cotton farmer responsible for the fi sh kill in the Barwon River was 
eventually prosecuted by the New South Wales State Pollution Control 
Commission on the basis of water samples taken on the Queensland side 
of the river by offi cers of the Queensland Department of Environment 
and Conservation104 and the police offi cer.105
That such evidentiary issues arose so late in the life of the legislation is 
indicative of the serious problems that plagued the Act’s administration 
throughout its period of enactment. Connected with the issue of 
evidence collection was the question of standards of water pollution 
under the Act. 
100 Queensland, Annual Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administrative Investigations for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary 
Paper No. 109 (1991) 28.
101 Ibid.
102 Queensland, Annual Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administrative Investigations for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary 
Paper No. 109 (1991) 29.
103 Ibid 28–9.
104 Ibid. It was renamed the Queensland Department of Environment and 
Heritage by the time the Ombudsman submitted their 1990–91 annual 
report.
105 Queensland, Annual Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administrative Investigations for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary 
Paper No. 109 (1991) 28; State Pollution Control Commission v Brownlie 
[1990] NSWLEC 86 (Unreported, Cripps J, 1 August 1990), (6 August 
2010) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWLEC/1990/86.html>; 
Brownlie v State Pollution Control Commission (1992) 27 NSWLR 78. See 
also, Mark Leeming, ‘Resolving Confl icts between State Criminal Laws’ 
(1994) 12(1) Australian Bar Review 107, 111.
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C  Standards
The failure to set standards to assist in the defi nition of ‘pollution’ also 
helped to create a reluctance to prosecute. When law students from the 
University of Queensland inquired about scientifi c standards under the 
Act, the then Acting-Director of the Council, Leon Henry, responded that 
‘there was no need for scientifi c standards of water quality’. Henry then 
conceded that without ‘set standards, prosecutions would be practically 
impossible’. Henry’s solution was to suggest that the Council would wait 
‘until one prosecution took place then use this as a precedent for other 
prosecutions as to what constitutes “water pollution”’.106 The students 
concluded that ‘the present and future position is still unclear as to 
what constitutes “water pollution” when the legislation is examined’.107 
Their concerns mirrored industry complaints at this time, with business 
seeing the largest obstacle to meeting the requirements of the Act as 
‘the lack of guidelines for the discharge of effl uent both now and in the 
immediate future’.108 They urgently sought clarifi cation to ensure their 
compliance with the Act.109
When the Regulations to the Act were introduced they contained 
general110 and specifi c111 standards for waste discharges — which in the 
case of the former, appeared to Fisher: 
suffi ciently specifi c to support a criminal charge, but the specifi c 
standards either give to the Council general responsibility for 
determining the standard or require the Council to determine 
the appropriate standard relative to the fi tness of the water for 
the relevant use of the water. It is diffi cult to see either type of 
specifi c standard being taken to be suffi ciently precise to justify 
enforcement by criminal or perhaps even civil proceedings.112
A lack of prosecutions under the Act was common to environmental 
legislation generally in Queensland at this time and prevented 
legislation from being tested in the courts. This led former President 
106 Public Interest Research Group, above n 41, 67.
107 Ibid.
108 J. Armitt, ‘Water Quality Control Authorities — Please Communicate with 
Industry!’ (Paper presented at the Water Research Foundation of Australia 
(Queensland State Committee) ‘Water Pollution’ Symposium, University 
of Queensland, Brisbane, 15 August 1972) 2.1–2.6.
109 Ibid.
110 Clean Waters Regulations 1973 (Qld) reg 25(a–e).
111 Clean Waters Regulations 1973 (Qld) reg 26(a–d)(e)(i–viii).
112 Douglas Fisher, Environmental Law in Australia: An Introduction (1980) 173.
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of the Queensland Environmental Law Association, Ian Hodgetts, to 
comment at the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission Inquiry into 
the Improper Disposal of Liquid Waste in South-East Queensland: 
[P]resent legislation was never tested by litigation, its meaning 
was never clarifi ed and nothing was learned regarding 
defi ciencies. [Furthermore] this did not encourage compliance 
or understanding of the legislation.113
Successful environmental administration relies on the recognition 
that there are many tools for securing compliance. Regulators that 
are suffi ciently trained to carry out their duties under environmental 
laws, combined with a compliance culture which takes a wide view 
of enforcement options and values the importance of robust standards 
in regulatory implementation are vital prerequisites for strong 
environmental governance. The administration of the Act was clearly 
found wanting in these respects. An examination of the enforcement 
strategies utilised and dismissed by the Council underscores this point.
VIII  ENFORCEMENT TOOLS
A  Enforcement Options
Ayres and Braithwaite see the use of warning letters as a regulatory 
strategy as part of an enforcement pyramid model, in which persuasion 
and warnings (at the base of the pyramid) represent the majority of 
regulatory efforts, followed in ascending order of severity by civil 
penalty, criminal penalty, licence suspension, and fi nally licence 
revocation at the apex of the pyramid.114 Given these possible actions, 
the Council’s responses and the rigour with which compliance was 
pursued will now be considered.
113 ‘New law on waste vague, inquiry told’, Courier Mail (Brisbane), 13 
April 1994, 21. Hopes for reform were high, with senior Department of 
Environment and Heritage offi cials claiming that the State government’s 
newly enacted Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) would provide 
environmental protection policies with ‘real sting’ for the fi rst time: see 
Bill Mason, ‘Waste Disposal “out of control”’, Green Left Weekly Online, 
29 March 1995, no. 181, (6 August 2010) <http://www.greenleft.org.
au/1995/181/12314>.
114 Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 37, 35–6.
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B  The Council’s Enforcement Preferences
Queensland administrators conceded in 1992 interviews with Norberry 
that: ‘We … have not been a shoot fi rst and ask questions later 
organisation … we have tended historically to attempt to negotiate 
improvements before taking any legal action.’115 Their approach arose 
from: 
a belief in the usefulness of negotiation and education, a belief 
that criminal investigation and prosecution are extremely time-
consuming for the agency and of uncertain outcome and benefi t, 
and some concern that environmental offences are not regarded 
seriously in magistrates’ courts. The political environment 
in Queensland has also historically been unfavourable to 
the prosecution of polluters. Queensland offi cials said that 
prosecution would only be used when it was obvious that 
a person had set about fl outing the law and was causing a 
signifi cant environmental problem.116
For an organisation representative largely of government departments 
and business interests concerned with the economic development of 
the State, the Council had no hesitation in threatening prosecution in 
warning letters. These usually secured compliance and successfully 
brought about positive change in industry attitudes towards pollution. 
Examples include a pineapple waste dump operated by Wearing & Sons 
in the Pine Rivers Shire after a complaint from a member of the public 
to the Council,117 and complaints of pollution caused by vegetable 
washing at Palmer’s Carrot Washery at Boonah.118 
Although licence suspension and cancellation were threatened 
occasionally, for instance against the FJ Walker Ltd meatworks at 
115 Jennifer Norberry, ‘Australia’ in A. Alvazzi del Frate and J. Norberry 
(eds.), Environmental Crime, Sanctioning Strategies and Sustainable 
Development (1993) 27, 94.
116 Ibid. See also, Robyn Bartel, ‘Compliance and Complicity: An Assessment 
of the Success of Land Clearance Legislation in New South Wales’ (2003) 
20(2) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 116, 126–7.
117 Minutes of the 38th Meeting of the Water Quality Council of Queensland, 
17 March 1976, Environmental Co-Ordination, Waste Disposal, Water 
Pollution (other than oil) (Queensland State Archives item ID: 574159).
118 Notice of the 72nd Meeting of the Water Quality Council of Queensland, 29 
August 1979, Environmental Co-Ordination, Waste Disposal, Water Quality 
Council of Queensland, Minutes and Agendas of Meetings (Queensland 
State Archives item ID: 574163).
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Maryborough,119 the legislation was not designed for this purpose. Self-
regulation was promoted instead. The Council’s powers to cancel or 
suspend a licence were limited to circumstances where the licensee 
was convicted of an offence under the Act, where the licensee failed 
to comply with the conditions of their licence, where the licence was 
granted on false or erroneous information, or if the Council received 
advice from the licensee that they no longer required a licence.120 
As Fisher points out: ‘These are matters over which the licensee has 
control. It is, therefore, not open to the government agency responsible 
for the [Clean Waters] legislation to determine unilaterally that the 
licence should be cancelled or suspended.’121  Although these means of 
enforcement were open to the Council, negotiation was overwhelmingly 
favoured, as the case studies below demonstrate. 
C  Case Studies of Negotiation and Warning Letters
Despite aggressively pursuing industry compliance with the Act 
for some businesses, the Council could also be quite tolerant where 
fulfi lment of licence conditions under the Act was found to be lacking 
over an extended period. Two examples traverse both the Council 
and post-Council eras of the Act’s administration. The fi rst concerned 
the World Heritage listing of the Great Barrier Reef in 1981 and the 
fears expressed by conservationists that the Federal Government was 
ignoring environmentally damaging tourism development proposals on 
islands that had World Heritage status in Queensland. One such resort at 
Hamilton Island had a detrimental impact, caused by sewage discharging 
from the resort into the surrounding reef during the late 1980s, with 
only solids being removed before disposal. Ongoing pollution occurred, 
despite the fact that the Council had made approval of the resort’s 1985 
licence under the Act contingent upon the construction of a treatment 
plant. The Council asked the resort in May 1988 to comply with the 
licence condition, but the treatment plant was still unfi nished 10 months 
119 Minutes of the 114th Meeting of the Water Quality Council of Queensland, 
9 November 1983, Environmental Co-Ordination, Waste Disposal, Water 
Quality Council of Queensland, Minutes and Agendas of Meetings 
(Queensland State Archives item ID: 574179).
120 Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) s 28.
121 Douglas Fisher, ‘The Meaning and Signifi cance of Resource Security’ in A. 
Gardner (ed.), The Challenge of Resource Security: Law and Policy (1993) 
16, 38.
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later.122 Other cases of water pollution in tourism locations away from 
sewered areas concerned the Council throughout this period.123
Another example arose in one of the few prosecutions attempted under 
the Act, Scheumack v Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd.124 Queensland Nickel 
Pty Ltd’s nickel ore refi nery north of Townsville was at Yabulu, one 
kilometre from Saunders Beach on Halifax Bay. The prosecution arose 
in relation to two complaints laid in the Townsville Magistrates Court 
by the Department of Environment and Heritage (a successor to the 
Council) on 12 September 1990, alleging that on 27 November and 
16 December 1989, Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd discharged ammonia 
waste into waters leading to two extensive fi sh kills, when it did not 
have a licence under the Act to do so.125
The nickel refi nery process required a great deal of water and the 
waste product of tailing mud contained nickel, cobalt and ammonia. 
Queensland Nickel built tailing dams to hold this waste but by 1990 
their holding capacity was considerably reduced by silting. The 
company held a licence from 1975 onwards to discharge waste water 
into Halifax Bay under the Act.126 The company was encouraged to 
limit discharge of waste through recycling, irrigation and evaporation, 
but this was inadequate during the wet season when dams overfl owed 
122  David Haigh, ‘Marine World Heritage Sites’ (1997) 2 (2) Asia Pacifi c 
Journal of Environmental Law 133, 144; Greg Roberts, ‘Development 
bulldozes heritage listing on barrier reef islands’, Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 6 March 1989, 3; Leith Young, ‘Sewage will destroy reefs, says 
scientist’, The Age (Melbourne), 10 March 1989, 15.
123 Part of the problem was a lack of specialist skills in some communities to 
supervise treatment plants.  The Council sought to improve the consistency 
of effl uent quality by inserting a requirement for trained supervision of plant 
operations in licences. This approach was successful to an extent. Queensland, 
Annual Report of the Water Quality Council of Queensland for the year ended 
30 June, Parliamentary Paper No. 53 (1984) 4; ‘Water pollution “a growing 
problem”’, Courier Mail (Brisbane), 3 October 1984, 9.
124 Scheumack v Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd, Unreported decision, Magistrates 
Court, Townsville, 22 April 1991, B.D. Barrett, SM (Department of 
Environment and Resource Management Archival File 470092 Batch 2A, 
Townsville District). Case notes of this decision are more readily available: 
Haigh, above n 93, 172–3; Michael White, Marine Pollution Laws of the 
Australasian Region (1994) 202.
125 Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) s 23(1); Sheumack v Queensland Nickel Pty 
Ltd, 1.
126 Scheumack v Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd, 8.
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into nearby salt water creeks through a stormwater drain.127 Discharges 
such as these were not licensed under the Act, but had been previously 
discussed between the defendant and the Council from 1977 onward and 
the parties appear to have been in a process of gradual negotiation.128 
Queensland Nickel argued that these conversations with Departmental 
representatives over a number of years constituted an agreement to 
make use of the stormwater drain and an informal ‘licence to spill’.129 
The prosecution denied this.  
Magistrate Barry Barrett dismissed the charges made against Queensland 
Nickel and confi rmed the defendant’s view that an agreement between 
the Department and Queensland Nickel existed, in the absence of any 
action taken by the Department to force Queensland Nickel to ‘desist 
from its practice, and procedure, in relation to discharge of waste via 
its stormwater drain outlet at the Yabulu plant’.130 One witness, former 
Water Quality Director Humphrey Desmond, informed the Court on 
the question of prosecution, that ‘no warning letters were sent to the 
Defendant company … [and that] it was a policy of the government 
of the day to tolerate such problems of companies similar to the 
Defendant’.131 This suggests that in some circumstances, even the 
lowest rung of Braithwaite and Ayres’ enforcement pyramid was not 
utilised by the Council. The decision reveals the extent to which the 
Council was prepared to compromise with industry over the timeliness 
of meeting standards. 
More generally, the policy of compromise and tolerance is refl ected in 
the number of prosecutions attempted under the Act. Prior to 1990 two 
prosecutions were conducted, with one conviction and one dismissal. 
Prosecutions during the post-Fitzgerald era of the Act increased slightly, 
127 Ibid 8, 10.
128 Scheumack v Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd, 9–10.
129 Ibid 10–14.
130 Scheumack v Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd, 18.
131 Ibid 9.
74 David J Turton
with one conviction and four dismissals between 1990 and 1995.132 A 
signifi cant factor in the Council’s tolerance of both delayed compliance 
and very limited use of prosecutions as a means of enforcement arose 
from the competing priorities of the state at this time.
D  The Consequences of Persuasion
The Council’s reluctance to insist upon rapid compliance with licence 
conditions is best understood in the context of the high priority given 
to economic development at this point in Queensland’s history — 
with economic and social considerations having greater merit than 
environmental concerns on more than a few occasions, as explained in 
1975:
In a few cases, it is diffi cult to see how an industry can continue, 
and at the same time comply with reasonable and desirable 
conditions for water quality. In two of these cases, an investigation 
is being made by the Co-ordinator General’s Department into the 
social and economic consequences if the industries are forced to 
close down. Following these investigations, it may be necessary 
for the Water Quality Council to seek a policy decision from the 
132 Briody and Prenzler, above n 42, 62; Briody, above n 42, 41. Briody’s 
fi gures are based on Crown Law records and appear to be the most reliable 
available. Several authors have given erroneous prosecution numbers, 
fuelling community perceptions of ineffective pollution control. For the 
claim of only one conviction under the Act’s ‘24 year history’, see Roslyn 
MacDonald, ‘Natural Resources Law and Policy in Queensland’ (1996) 3(1) 
Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 125, 126. Others 
ignore attempted prosecutions, see Hutton and Connors, above n 2, 217. 
Bonyhady misread David Haigh when claiming that the ‘fi rst prosecution 
under Queensland’s Clean Waters Act was in 1991, 20 years after this 
legislation came into force’. This is incorrect on two grounds. Firstly, the 
legislation came into force in March 1973 not 1971. Secondly, Haigh merely 
notes that the Scheumack v Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd decision signifi ed the 
‘hope for an end to the extended honeymoon between government and water 
polluters in Queensland’, not that it was the fi rst prosecution under the Act, 
see Bonyhady, above n 57, 110, 170; Haigh, above n 93, 172. For anecdotal 
evidence of prosecutions, see Maddin, above n 44, 110. Regardless of the 
fi gures cited, all authors are correct in noting the limited prosecution record 
of the Act. Other commentators have sought to equate the ‘failure’ of the Act 
to prevent pollution with the absence of prosecutions. See, eg, Tor Hundloe, 
‘Heads They Win, Tails We Lose: Environment and the Law’ in P. Wilson 
and J. Braithwaite (eds.), Two Faces of Deviance: Crimes of the Powerless 
and the Powerful (1978) 132, 134.
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State Government.133
Throughout its history the Council’s policy was one of persuasion and 
negotiation, but the media received and refl ected mixed messages about 
enforcement, sometimes in the same newspaper article. Following a 
decision by Cabinet not to prosecute a company for a fi sh kill at Breakfast 
Creek (Brisbane) in January 1977,134 after the company undertook ‘to 
spend big sums on installing better discharge systems, immediately’, 
Minister Russell Hinze spoke with the press and warned industries that 
prosecutions would start. However, Hinze also stated the government’s 
policy towards pollution, admitting a lax attitude: ‘We have been lenient 
— perhaps too lenient — in enforcing this Act because we have a policy 
of co-operation with industry rather than confrontation.’135 This policy 
was repeated in the fi nal Annual Report of the Council ten years later, 
with the additional observation that: 
while this approach has been successful in achieving the desired 
result [of compliance] in all but a few cases, it has often been 
at the expense of protracted compliance times and has required 
increased negotiation effort on the part of staff.136
Queensland’s policy of compromise and persuasion was not unique. 
Bonyhady made similar observations of the Council’s New South Wales 
counterpart, the State Pollution Control Commission (SPCC), and it is 
possible that the cooperative approach adopted by both bodies resulted 
in some positive, though limited, effects for the environment: 
[T]he SPCC relied primarily on ‘conciliation’ … By seeking 
the cooperation of industry where possible and only punishing 
companies which either make no attempt to comply or commit 
signifi cant or recurrent breaches, authorities such as the SPCC 
may achieve more for the environment than if they prosecute 
133 Queensland, Annual Report of the Water Quality Council of Queensland 
for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary Paper No. 50 (1975) 2; J.M. 
Powell, Plains of Promise, Rivers of Destiny: Water Management and 
the Development of Queensland 1824–1990 (1991) 291–2; Mark Carden, 
‘Unsustainable Development in Queensland’ in K. Walker and K. Crowley 
(eds.), Australian Environmental Policy 2: Studies in Decline and 
Devolution (1999) 81, 100.
134 ‘Dead fi sh in second creek’, Courier Mail (Brisbane), 12 January 1977, 
10.
135 ‘Govt.’s “last” warning on pollution’, Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 6 March 
1977, 12.
136 Queensland, Annual Report of the Water Quality Council of Queensland 
for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary Paper No. 90 (1987) 13.
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every violation. But conciliation by itself is a euphemism for 
taking no effective action.137
As shown above in the Breakfast Creek example, the Council relied on 
the threatened possibility of future prosecutions to ensure compliance. 
Gunningham has pointed out that: 
[T]his ‘negotiated compliance’ can only work if the 
inspectorate has credibility. The threat of prosecution must lie 
in the background and the regulated industry must believe that 
inspectors can and do resort to punishment if persuasion fails — 
hence the importance of bargaining and bluff to inspectors with 
limited resources and powers, engaging in this strategy.138
However, the statistics cited earlier show the Council and its successor 
regulatory bodies rarely resorted to prosecution or even threatened 
prosecution — as indicated above by the lengthy compliance times 
granted to industry. Gunningham has argued that ‘such an extreme 
“advise and persuade strategy”, which almost entirely rejects prosecution 
as a regulatory tool, will produce a widespread breakdown of voluntary 
compliance’, as businesses lacked an incentive to observe the Act in 
the absence of fi rm offi cial sanctions.139 Conversely, an aggressive 
culture of prosecution amongst regulators can result in the breakdown 
of communications with the regulated population, reducing information 
fl ow and causing a loss of trust between the parties, damaging their 
capacity to work towards compliance.140 It is interesting to note that 
the present-day Queensland Department of Environment and Resource 
137 Bonyhady, above n 57, 110. See also, Nicholas Brunton, ‘Environmental 
Regulation: The Challenge Ahead’ (1999) 24(3) Alternative Law Journal, 
137, 141; Maria Comino and Paul Leadbeter, ‘Enforcement of Pollution 
Laws in Australia — Past Experience and Current Trends’ (Paper presented 
at the 5th International Conference on Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement, Monterey, California, United States of America, 16–20 
November 1998) 65, (6 August 2010) <http://www.inece.org/5thvoll/
comino.pdf>.
138 Neil Gunningham, ‘Negotiated Non-Compliance: A Case Study of 
Regulatory Failure’ (1987) 9(1) Law and Policy 69, 84.
139 Ibid. See also, Queensland, Criminal Justice Commission, Report on an 
Investigation Conducted by the Honourable R.H. Matthews QC into the 
Improper Disposal of Liquid Waste in South-East Queensland (1994) vol 
2, 119–20.
140 Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, ‘Regulation and the Role of Trust: 
Refl ections from the Mining Industry’ (2009) 36(2) Journal of Law and 
Society 167–94.
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Management also regard prosecution as a tool of last resort.141
The Council focused its regulatory efforts on persuasion and warning 
letters for a number of reasons, including the economic imperative of the 
state over other public policy concerns. This is linked with the diffi culties 
the Council experienced in remaining free of political interference 
and regulatory capture. Effective environmental governance requires 
more than a steadfast commitment to one regulatory strategy over all 
others to safeguard economic interests. Consistency in enforcement is 
also important for environmental governance, both for the regulated 
population and the credibility of the regulator. The above examples 
show that the Council struggled in this respect. One key means of 
avoiding a myopic conception of environment governance is to permit 
public participation in a variety of forms. Failure to do so reduced the 
impact of the Council as an environmental watchdog and left community 
misunderstandings of the Council uncorrected.
IX  THE PLACE OF THE PUBLIC 
In its fi rst years the Council was principally occupied with issuing 
licences and public relations.142 Both the Council and Minister attempted 
to inform the community of the new legislation and the Council’s roles 
through the press,143 conferences,144 and educational materials on water 
pollution in schools.145 The extent to which the public was engaged 
with the Council’s enforcement of the Act varied, depending on the 
mechanism for their involvement. Reporting pollution to the Council 
141 See Queensland Department of Environment and Resource Management, 
Enforcement Management Guidelines: Enforcement Guidelines (December 
2004).
142 Minutes of Environmental Control Council Meeting, 10 July 1974, 
Brisbane, Environmental Control Council (Queensland State Archives 
item ID: 882610).
143 Agenda for the 1st meeting of the Water Quality Council, 25 May 1972, 
Brisbane, Environmental Control, Water Quality Council (Clean Waters 
Act 1971) (Queensland State Archives item ID: 882614).
144 See, eg, Leon Henry, ‘The Water Quality Council of Queensland: A Policy 
for the Environment’ (Paper presented at the Water Research Foundation 
of Australia (Queensland State Committee) ‘Water Pollution’ Symposium, 
University of Queensland, Brisbane, 15 August 1972) 1.1–1.12.
145 Agenda for the 12th meeting of the Water Quality Council of Queensland, 
22 August 1973, Environmental Control, Water Quality Council (Clean 
Waters Act 1971) (Queensland State Archives item ID: 882614).
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was a common means of community participation and, where delayed, 
exacerbated the environmental governance problems discussed above. 
The lack of standing rights to contest the Council’s decisions and 
attempts to limit information about the Act’s administration were also 
a concern.
A  Reporting Pollution
Fish kills at Norman Creek in 1981 and Kedron Brook, north of 
Brisbane, in 1985 were two of many instances where delays meant that 
pollution sources and the responsibility for them could not be traced 
successfully.146 The Council observed that: ‘a diffi culty in solving 
some complaints is that the effect complained of disappears before it 
can be seen by an inspector, due to a delay in reporting, and a repeat 
incident must be awaited before an adequate investigation can be 
undertaken.’147
The Council also grappled with educating the general public about water 
pollution issues and noted that many complaints from citizens were:
well justifi ed, but a signifi cant number arise from a lack of 
understanding of the effects of water pollution and the problems 
in attaining what would be in effect zero pollution. Where 
practicable, discussions are held with the person making the 
complaint and the position explained to him [sic].148
The visibility of the Council in the public eye was also an issue for 
inspectors. Despite the sustained media coverage of the Council’s 
activities, one inspector of water quality admitted that some owners of 
premises being inspected ‘in the early days probably didn’t know who 
we were’.149 Public reporting of pollution and complaints made to the 
Council were only two aspects of potential community engagement, 
146 Notice of the 95th Meeting of the Water Quality Council of Queensland, 
9 December 1981, Environmental Co-ordination, Waste Disposal, Water 
Quality Council of Queensland, Minutes and Agendas of Meetings 
(Queensland State Archives item ID: 574172); Notice of the 128th Meeting 
of the Water Quality Council of Queensland, 10 April 1985, Environmental 
Co-ordination, Waste Disposal, Water Quality Council of Queensland, 
Minutes and Agendas of Meetings (Queensland State Archives item ID: 
574185).
147 Queensland, Annual Report of the Water Quality Council of Queensland 
for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary Paper No. 53 (1984) 4.
148 Queensland, Annual Report of the Water Quality Council of Queensland 
for the year ended 30 June, Parliamentary Paper No. 50 (1975) 2.
149 Interview with Les Bevis (Telephone interview, September 2007).
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with access to licence information under the Act also posing diffi culties 
for open and effective environmental governance.
B  Scrutiny of Licence Registers
The capacity of the Council to be captured by industry arose not 
only in relation to its limited membership, but in the lack of public 
participation in its appeals process. It has been recognised that public 
participation in environmental litigation can be used to remedy or 
restrain breaches of environmental laws, expose regulatory capture, 
and ‘compel the regulator to perform its public duty of upholding and 
enforcing environmental law’.150 Other Australian States’ legislation 
at the time allowed public participation to varying degrees.151 Public 
participation also lends itself to community oversight in environmental 
decision-making, and this seems to have been deliberately avoided in the 
formation of the Council. Indeed there was a fear that conservationists 
might embarrass the Council. 
During the drafting of the Regulations to the Act, a clash emerged 
between members of the newly formed Council and the Minister for 
Local Government and Electricity, Henry McKechnie. The confl ict 
arose from the Council’s desire to permit public inspection of registers 
of licences, notices and notifi cations granted under the Regulations.152 
Registers did not contain details of the conditions of a licence or notice, 
but the Minister felt obliged to retain confi dentiality and, with a nod to 
the Clean Air Act 1963 (Qld), stated: 
[T]here is a risk that a person such as an ardent conservationist, 
might use information so obtained to harass a Local Authority 
or an industry or the Water Quality Council. It is understood that 
there is no provision in the Regulations under the Clean Air Act 
for the inspection by the public of registers etc, kept under those 
Regulations. I feel that the opening of registers, etc kept under 
the Clean Waters Act to inspection by the public could lead to 
150 Justice Brian Preston, ‘The Role of Public Interest Environmental Litigation’ 
(2006) 23(5) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 337, 342. See 
also, Donald Anton, ‘Political Dissent, Environmental Protection and the 
Law’ (Paper presented at the National Environmental Defender’s Offi ce 
Network One Day Conference: ‘Defending the Defenders — Protest, the 
Environment and the Law’, Sydney, 24 October 1998) 2, 3.
151 Bonyhady, above n 57, 21–39, 152–6.
152 Cabinet Minute Submission No. 15816 Part 1, 12 October 1972 
(Queensland State Archives 6 August 2010) <http://www.archives.qld.gov.
au/1972cabdocs/Submissions/15816_part01.pdf
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diffi culties and I feel that this provision in the draft Regulations 
might, with advantage, be deleted. The policing of the Act and 
the Regulations is a function of the Water Quality Council and 
provision is made for prosecution of a licence holder if he [or 
she] breaches conditions of his [or her] licence. I think that this 
acts as a protection to the public interest and that there should be 
no need for registers to be open to public inspection.153
Cabinet approved McKechnie’s judgment and the provision was 
removed from the Regulations.154 It would not be the last time that a 
Minister rejected a recommendation from the Council. This episode 
highlights the extent to which public participation was discouraged 
under the legislation quite early. Nonetheless, this restriction on public 
involvement was relaxed in 1979 amendments to the Act that granted 
the public the right, for a reasonable fee, to examine the effl uent 
quality standards of licences under the registers kept by the Council 
— after much pressure had been brought to bear on the Government 
by the Labor Opposition and conservation groups.155 Another method 
of excluding the public was through the omission of standing (locus 
standi) provisions in the Act itself.156 
C  Standing
The Minister could authorise any person to prosecute an offence 
against the Act’s criminal provisions,157 though some suggest this 
was potentially subject to political interference.158 The availability 
of civil actions by individuals was otherwise absent from the Act.159 
An application of the Act to the leading case of the time, Australian 
Conservation Foundation v Commonwealth, would suggest that as the 
legislation did not provide for participation by outsiders, any attempt by 
conservation groups to use the regulatory process of the statute would 
153 Ibid.
154 Cabinet Minute Decision No. 17757, 16 October 1972 (Queensland State 
Archives 6 August 2010) <http://www.archives.qld.gov.au/1972cabdocs/
Decisions/17757.pdf>.
155 Clean Waters Act Amendment Act 1979 (Qld) s 26(2); Queensland, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 6 June 1979, 4923 (Russell 
Hinze).
156 Timothy Longwill, ‘Standing in Environmental Interest Suits’ (1987) 3 
Queensland Institute of Technology Law Journal 77, 93.
157 Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) s 47(2).
158 Stephen Keim and Joanne Bragg, ‘Standing on Castle Hill’ (1994) 19(2) 
Alternative Law Journal 68, 69.
159 Ibid.
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not have strengthened their claim for standing to seek judicial review 
of the Council’s and Minister’s decisions.160 Such omissions from 
both the Council and Act increased the risk of regulatory capture by 
severely limiting both appeals from the public and preventing external 
assessment by concerned citizens.
The limited role given to the public to participate in the Act’s enforcement 
through complaints of pollution to the Council, combined with the lack 
of standing rights and limited information about the Council’s impact 
in reducing water pollution, sits in stark contrast to developments since 
this period in the area of ‘new environmental governance’, which 
stresses participation and collaboration with the community.161 It would 
appear that lessons are being learnt on this front by environmental 
administrators.
X  CONCLUSION
This article has examined a variety of factors surrounding the 
governance of the Clean Waters Act 1971 (Qld) in the period 1970–
87 and has indicated that the Act’s enforcement failed on a number of 
levels, such as a lack of resources, political interference and lack of 
opportunities for public participation. This is consistent with Briody 
and Prenzler’s contention of political interference with environmental 
regulatory agencies in post-Fitzgerald Queensland. It also confi rms the 
suspicions of earlier researchers concerned with political interference 
in the enforcement of the legislation162 and is broadly consistent with 
the critique of the Act (and Australian environmental laws generally) 
by commentators during the period discussed and beyond. Further 
research will be required to comment thoroughly on elements of 
Briody and Prenzler’s argument of a tradition of under-enforcement in 
Queensland’s environmental regulators, especially a lack of training in 
prosecutorial techniques for inspectors.
The article has also shown that, despite seemingly ideal conditions for 
160 (1980) 146 CLR 493, 531–2 (Gibbs J). For a fuller discussion of judicial 
review and its relationship to Queensland’s environmental laws of the time 
see Nicolee Dixon, ‘Judicial Review of Environmental Decision Making in 
Queensland’ (1994) 3(1) Griffi th Law Review 94.
161 See Cameron Holley, ‘Public participation, environmental law and new 
governance: Lessons for designing inclusive and representative participatory 
processes’ (2010) 27(5) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 360.
162 Norberry, above n 67, 167; Keim and Bragg, above n 158, 69.
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the development of regulatory capture in the Council, it is unlikely 
that this was responsible for the Council’s poor enforcement of the 
Act. More plausible explanations may lie in the discretion exercised 
by individual fi eld inspectors, interference by a Minister who favoured 
a conciliatory relationship with industry, as well as evidentiary, 
procedural and resourcing diffi culties. In failing to address such issues, 
the Council alienated those most likely to assist in monitoring the state 
for compliance and accordingly failed to exhibit the vital prerequisites 
for effective environmental governance.
It should be noted that there have been signifi cant changes to 
environmental regulation in Queensland since the period described in 
this article. Although its present day status is beyond the scope of this 
article and is not discussed here, it is clear that present day legislators 
and administrators alike need to remain vigilant in avoiding political 
interference, community exclusion from the enforcement process and 
inadequate resourcing, to ensure robust environmental governance in 
the modern era. Encouragingly, modern environmental administrators 
are showing signs of learning from past mistakes.
